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Abstract
The standard axiomatization of quantum mechanics (QM) is not fully explicit about
the role of the time-parameter. Especially, the time reference within the probability
algorithm (the Born Rule, BR) is unclear. Using a plausible principle P1, about the
role of probability in a physical theory, and a second principle P2 affording a most
natural way to make BR precise, a logical conflict with the standard expression for
the completeness of QM can be derived. Rejecting P1 is implausible. Rejecting P2
leads to unphysical results and to a conflict with a generalization of P2, a principle
P3. It is thus made plausible that the standard expression of QM completeness must
be revised. An absolutely explicit form of the axioms is provided, including a precise
form of the projection postulate. An appropriate expression for QM completeness,
reflecting the restrictions of the Gleason and Kochen-Specker theorems is proposed.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum mechanics (QM), the most elementary of quantum theories, can be shown
to be complete in a quite precise sense. It is impossible to assign pre-existing values to
suitable physical systems beyond the QM allowances, under two plausible constraints. Take
a physical system S such that its QM representation requires a Hilbert space H with
dim(H) > 2. (A one-particle spin-1 system is an example.) It is impossible, in this case,
to assign pre-existing values to all QM observables under the constraints that (i) algebraic
relations among such value assignments mirror the algebraic relations among the (operators
representing the) QM observables; (ii) the value assignments are non-contextual, i.e. every
submaximal (degenerate) observable gets assigned a unique value, not one relativized to
the different maximal (non-degenerate) observables of which it is a function. An indirect
proof of this fact is immediately obtained from Gleason’s Theorem [1]. The theorem entails
that, when {P} is the set of all projection operators on H, every mapping µ: {P} → [0, 1]
being interpretable as a probability function must be continuous, while a value assignment
obeying (i) and (ii) must induce a mapping µ′: {P} → [0, 1] that is discontinuous [2]. A
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direct , i.e. constructive proof is the Kochen-Specker theorem [3, 4, 5, 6], presenting a finite
set of operators for which an assignment obeying (i) and (ii) fails.
But why does the impossibility of assigning pre-existing values under these constraints
tell us anything about QM completeness? After all, the theory’s empirical output consists
just in probabilities for measurement results and their generalizations: expectation values.
In an axiomatic formulation, QM is formally incapable of directly making value assignments,
so it cannot generate anything conflicting with any value assignment to S. The natural
idea filling this logical gap is the insight that some probability assignments entail value
assignments, namely those that predict values with certainty. E.g., a QM prediction to the
effect that S, with probability 1, will be found to have a property ak at time t makes it
plausible to conclude that S, at that time, has ak. Working, from now on, in the Schro¨dinger
picture, writing states as density operators, and taking A as a discrete observable on S
with values a1, a2, . . . , we can express this idea as:
If Pak (t), then ak (t).
(Here, Pak (t) = | a(t) > < a(t) |, ‘Pak (t)’ abbreviates ‘S is in state Pak (t)’, and
‘ak (t)’ abbreviates ‘S has ak at t’.) Adding such a plausible rule to the QM formalism,
we can extract value assignments, but nothing near a set of values big enough to conflict
with either the discontinuous assignment used in the corollary of Gleason’s Theorem or the
assignment to some Kochen-Specker set of operators. This will be the case only if we limit
ourselves to the value assignments following from the QM state as follows:
EE ak(t) if and only if Pak(t).
This condition establishes a logical link between QM and the two theorems and thus
makes precise in which sense they prove QM completeness. Indeed, the condition (often
called the eigenstate-eigenvalue link, hence the label ‘EE’) embodies the classic definition
of QM completeness [7, 8]. EE substantiates the generally accepted and most familiar
idea that a QM system in a superposition of A eigenstates does not have a value of A.
3
This idea plays a special role when interpreters try to say what goes on when S, being in
superposition of A-eigenstates, meets an A-measurement device. It is standardly claimed
that S, during the measurement interaction, takes on one of the A values, e.g. ak [9]. If S is
found to have a value of A, e.g. ak, at a certain time, then EE dictates that S’s state is the
pertaining eigenstate, e.g. Pak , at this time. A slightly less exact form of this consequence
would be: If S is found to have value ak, of A, then S’s state immediately becomes the
pertaining eigenstate e.g. Pak . This latter requirement is generally called the projection
postulate [10]. Projection, i.e. S’s adopting an A-eigenstate during A-measurement, is
generally thought to be an empirically confirmed fact and with good reason. We can
measure copies of S for A, filter out the non-ak results, and then experimentally confirm
the remaining state to be Pak , e.g. via quantum-state tomography [11, 12]. EE seems to
have an exact version of the projection postulate as its consequence, thus seems to embody
both the completeness of QM and the necessity of projection upon finding a certain result.
For future reference, I extract from EE the parts representing, respectively, the complete-
ness condition (COMP) and the simplest candidate for a precise projection postulate (CPP):
COMP If S is not in state Pak(t), then not ak(t).
CPP If ak(t), then S is in state Pak(t).
(Note that, by contraposition, both COMP and CPP express the same (backward
or ‘only if’-) direction of EE.) The aim of the present paper is to show that COMP
(and, consequently CPP) is in harmony with QM, in its standard axiomatization, and
to provide more appropriate expressions for completeness and projection. More exactly,
I will show COMP to be in conflict with QM as follows. I briefly review the standard
axioms of QM and point out that two of them are not fully unambiguous concerning
the role of the time parameter. I introduce three reasonable principles, P1-P3, where
P3 is a generalized version of P2. The first principle P1 concerns the interpretation of
probabilities in a physical theory, in general, while P2 and P3 refer specifically to the time
parameter in QM and remove the ambiguity in the axioms. (All axioms and principles
are introduced in Sec. II.) However, using P1 and P2 to interpret QM probabilities, we
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can produce a contradiction from QM and COMP (Sec. III). It will immediately be clear
that P1 is not open to reasobale doubt and that sacrificing P2 leads to an implausible
and unphysical consequence. Hence, the standard way to express the completeness
of QM, i.e. COMP, must be revised. The latter is not an appropriate expression of
the limitations generated by the Gleason and Kochen-Specker theorems. Principle P2
suggests a more precise version of the QM axioms, including a precise version of the
projection postulate (Sec. VI). Finally, a version of completeness will be proposed that
both represents the limitations due to the two theorems and respects these axioms (Sec. VII).
Some interpretations of QM reject the projection postulate and EE; they are now
collected under the title of modal interpretations [13]. This group of interpretations has a
weaker expression of completeness at hand:
COMP* If S is in a pure state W(t) 6= Pak(t), then not ak(t).
The rationale of COMP* is this: While a measurement may leave S in a mixture (obtained
by partial tracing of the state of the S-cum-apparatus-supersystem) such that we can say
that S has adopted one of A’s values without state projection, we still can express the
idea that S, in a pure state W(t) at interaction onset, does not have any value of A. This
possibility of implementing a weaker form of completeness into a weaker version of QM must
be considered, which is done in a digression comprising Sec.s IV. and V. I show that rejecting
P2, despite its plausibility must go along with rejecting the projection postulate, thus the
acceptance of a reduced version of QM (the standard axioms without projection postulate),
like the one adopted in modal interpretations (Sec. IV). Then I consider the third principle
P3, a generalized version of P2, and show that COMP* and the reduced version of QM make
P3 implausible (Sec. V). By nature of the foundational and conceptual questions involved,
the reasoning will consist of logical, not mathematical, argument throughout.
5
II. AXIOMS AND PRINCIPLES
Consider the following standard axiomatization of QM, using again the Schro¨dinger
picture and projection operators:
A1 Any QM system S is associated with a unique Hilbert space H and its
state is represented by a unique density operator W(t) on H, a function
of time.
A2 Any physical quantity A (called an observable) is represented by a
self-adjoint operator A on H and the possible values of A (possible
properties of S) by the numbers in the spectrum of A.
A3 S evolves in time according to W(t) = U(t)W(t0)U(t)
−1 where
U(t)=exp[-iH t], a unitary operator, is a function of time and H is an
operator representing the total energy of S.
A4 If S is in state W(t) and A is an observable on S, then the
expectation value <A> is: <A> = Tr(W(t)A).
A5 If S is found to have value ak as a result of an A measurement, then
S’s state is Pak immediately after this measurement.
In view of the above discussion, I henceforth denote as QM the theory based on
A1-A5, while a reduced version, based on A1-A4 only, will be called QM−. Axiom
A2 motivates an identification of physical observables and their mathematical repre-
sentatives and I will not need to distinguish them. I will also, for simplicity, restrict
myself to one discrete observable A throughout. Finally, I will mostly restrict A4 to
probabilities, i.e. expectation values of yes-no observables of type Pai. Let ak always be
some fixed value of variable ai. Let ‘p(ak)’ mean the probability that S has ak. Then,
since <Pak > = p(ak), A4 takes on a simpler, very familiar form, called the Born Rule (BR):
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BR If S is in state W(t) and A is an observable on S with eigenvalue ak,
then the probability that S has ak is: p(ak) = Tr(W(t)Pak).
It should be emphasized that these axioms, though fairly standard, do not constitute a
fully satisfactory axiomatization of QM since A4 and A5, in their present form, leave the
role of the time parameter unspecified or vague. The defect in A4 carries over to BR, in
whose equation only the right side, but not the left, carries a time-index. Two of the three
principles, to be discussed presently, will have the sole purpose of forcing an unambiguous
explication of the time-parameter on the left side of ‘p(ak) = Tr(W(t)Pak)’ and it should
be stressed that the interpretations produced from these principles and considered below
exhaust all the reasonable options.
Here are three principles, the first concerning the role of probability in a physical theory
in general, the second and third its role in QM. The first principle can be motivated by the
idea that probability is quantified possibility. More precisely: If a physical theory assigns
an event a non-zero probability, then, given the theory’s truth, this event is possible. The
weakest form of possibility is logical possibility. Thus, yet more precisely:
P1 If, for a proposition F (describing an event) a theory T yields another
proposition p(F) > 0, then it is not the case that T, F ⊢⊥.
(Here ‘T, F ⊢⊥’ means that the set of sentences including F and all sentences of T allows
to derive a contradiction in first-order logic.) P1 is beyond reasonable doubt, but it also
follows from natural assumptions about probability shared by the main interpretations of
that notion [14].
The second principle runs:
P2 Any expression ‘ak’ such that it names a QM event can be qualified as
7
‘ak(t)’, where t is a time-parameter.
P2 is motivated by the idea that a fundamental physical theory must explicitly concern
spacetime events. A fundamental theory that builds probability spaces over sets of events
must be able to explicitly treat these events as spacetime events. Hence, all events that are
assigned probabilities in QM must explicitly be spacetime events, here: properties (like ak)
possessed at certain sharp times. Fully relativistic versions of QM explicitly treat spacetime
events with a finite time-extension ∆t. In the present, non-relativistic, formulation we have
∆t = δt: QM events just consist in S having one or more properties at a sharp time t.
It should be stressed that relativistic generalizations always contain the limiting case δt
(see, e.g. [15]), hence an argument affecting QM in this respect will affect any relativistic
generalization. Note, however, that P2 just says that those events denoted by statements
of type ‘ak’ within the QM probabilities are spacetime events such that the expressions can
be explicated as ‘ak(t)’. The ‘ak’ may not be appropriate expressions of QM events within
BR and P2 may have no application.
The third principle, P3, generalizes P2. It says, in effect, that whatever the QM events
are (and whatever expressions denote them) these events can be qualified as spacetime
events explicitly. Thus:
P3 For any expression ‘F’ such that it QM yields an expression
‘p(F) = Tr(W(t)Pak)’ there is a parameter t in the formalism qualifying
‘F’ as ‘F(t)’.
P3 is formulated so wide as to appear vague. But it has only two specifications. The first
is to place the time-index ‘inside the probability’, the second ‘outside the probability’. Con-
sider the BR expression ‘p(ak) = Tr(W(t)Pak)’ made precise as ‘p(ak(t)) = Tr(W(t)Pak)’.
This makes QM fulfill P2. But there is an alternative: Read the BR expression as
‘p(t)(ak) = Tr(W(t)Pak)’ and interpret the latter in the following way: The probability
is a disposition of S at time t to display value ak (make ‘ak’ true). This idea is discussed
widely in the literature and is generally explicated by saying that t is the onset time of a
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measurement interaction on S and p(t)(emphak)’ quantifies S’s strength of disposition at t
toward displaying ak at some later time [4]. However, while this notion essentially refers
to the idea of probabilities as dispositions it does not need to refer to measurement. We
should avoid the impression that anything in our principles or axioms makes essential ref-
erence to measurement - as this is in fact unnecessary. We can speak more generally of a
region of space containing S and a time t such that ‘E(t)’ names the disposition at t to
display ak at some later time and call ‘E(t)’ the triggering event. We can then say that an
alternative to the preceding is to disambiguate ‘p(ak)’ as ‘p(t)(ak)’, which more explicitly
reads ‘p(ak) given E(t)). We thus have an alternative disambiguation of BR that obeys
our principle P3. (Note that the argument for only two possibilities is not strict. It would
require heavy metalinguistic machinery to show that ‘p (ak(t))’ and ‘p(t)(ak)’ are the only
ways to specify the time-reference in ‘p(ak)’.)
III. QM + COMP CONTRADICT PRINCIPLES P1 AND P2
P1 and P2 now generate the main argument against COMP. Using P2, we can make BR
precise in a most natural way. It can now be rendered more exactly:
BR′ If S is in state W(t) and A is an observable on S with eigenvalue ak,
then the probability that S has ak at t is: p(ak(t)) = Tr(W(t)Pak).
Now suppose that S is in a state W(t1) 6= Pak (t1), for some value t1 of t, such that
from BR′ it follows that 1 > p(ak (t1)) > 0. (Call this assumption N.) Assuming that
a theory contains all its consequences, QM + P2 will contain BR′. Now, let QM + P2,
COMP, and N be integrated into one artificial theory, QM′. Then, by simple sentential logic:
N (1) S is in state W(t1) (N)
N, BR′ (2) p(ak(t1)) > 0 (1), (BR
′)
N (3) ¬ Pak(t1) (N)
N, COMP (4) ¬ ak (t1) (3), (COMP)
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(As usual, the rightmost column indicates the assumptions on which the line in
question directly depends and the leftmost column the ones on which the line ultimately
depends.) By assumption, BR′, COMP, N, are members of QM′ which thus entails
both line (2), i.e. that a certain proposition is assigned a positive probability, and line
(4), i.e. that the negation of that proposition is true. Hence, QM′ entails p(ak(t1)) > 0,
but also: QM′, ak(t1) ⊢ ⊥, in contradiction with P1. Thus given P1, QM
′ cannot be true [16].
The argument presupposes that QM′, the artificial integration of QM, P2 and assumption
N is a theory. Is the integration of N an innocuous step? Of course, we can add suitable
propositions to QM to create a theory that contradicts virtually any other proposition.
But N is a trivially admissible state assignment that QM must be consistent with. So, its
integration into QM′ is innocuous indeed, but the one of P2 is not. BR′, COMP, N are in
conflict with P1, where BR′ is BR, interpreted via P2. Given that P1 is immune to rejection,
QM is in conflict with either P2 or COMP.
IV. QM− AS THE SOLE ALTERNATIVE
To reject P2 implies to give up on the most natural disambiguation of BR. The defender
of COMP will just say that within the BR equation ‘p(ak)’ cannot be read as ‘p(ak(t))’,
the impression of naturalness notwithstanding. But to reject P2 has consequences for
the axioms. Recall that A5, like A4 and BR, is vague. Let’s initially apply P2 to A5, yielding:
A5′ If S is found to have value ak(t) as a result of an A measurement, then
S’s state is Pak immediately after this measurement.
Note that A5′ still substantially differs from CPP. Both, however, make precise the
vague A5. Rejecting P2 would mean that A5 is not so made precise. It would mean,
in effect, that expressions like ‘ak’ are not explicated as ‘ak(t)’ throughout QM. In this
case, A5 automatically becomes vacuous. In the Schro¨dinger picture, state evolution
cannot start without a precise input state. It is the intention of A5, to generate such
an input – for starting post-measurement state evolution, e.g. when a measurement is
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a preparation. CPP generates a precise state from the precise ‘ak(t)’ and A5
′ at least
can be imagined to do so, when the phrase ‘immediately after’ is made precise. If A5 is
understood as containing an expression ‘ak’ that must not carry a time-index, it has no
such quality. It is a vacuous statement, not only without any empirical content, but also a
formally ineffective addition to the rest of QM. So, everyone seeking to escape the argument
of Sec. III by rejecting P2 will have to reject the projection postulate in any substantial form.
One might object that applying P2 to BR is one thing and applying it to A5 another.
But if we reject P2 for the expression ‘p(ak)’ (refuse to read it as ‘p(ak(t))’) we say
that these probabilities do not mean probabilities for ‘ak(t)’, nor that they are are they
tested by observations of type ‘ak(t)’. It is inconsistent then to allow such an observation
nevertheless and put it in the antecedent of A5.
All in all, rejecting P2 must go hand in hand with rejecting A5 and the interpretations
taking this route are the modal interpretations. Here we must not consider this group of
interpretations, in general, but a queer and artificial variant built on negating P2. Note
that ¬ P2 immediately transforms QM into an unphysical theory. Checking the axioms of
QM, we note that the theory (reasonably enough) contains a unique time parameter. (The
same goes for QM−.) If the theory supplies a time-index for ‘ak’ in ‘p(ak)’, to obey P2,
it must be this one. If, vice versa, we claim that ‘p(ak)’ does not inherit the time-index
directly from the state, i.e. from the right side of ‘p(ak) = Tr(W(t)Pak)’, we automatically
rule that it does not get any time-reference, at all. QM + ¬ P2 does no longer furnish the
measurement results, for which it provides probabilities, with exact time-indices. Perhaps
we could come up with an additional theory of QM measurement fixing the problem, but
any such theory would have to heavily revise the axioms, equipping the formalism with a
second time-parameter.
V. QM− + COMP* MAKE P3 IMPLAUSIBLE
Notice that nothing in the previous argument hinges on whether S’s state W(t) 6= Pak(t)
is a pure state or a mixture. So, if we can construct an argument similar to the one of
Sec. III, but referring to COMP* instead of COMP, we can disallow the combination QM−
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and COMP*. Such an argument can indeed be given using P3, but it lacks the rigor of the
above one.
Since P2 alone forces the interpretation of BR as BR′, the argument of Sec. III can
equally well be applied to COMP*. The defender of COMP* will have to reject P2 and
revise BR′. Given the assumption, made plausible above, that there is but one alternative
way to specify BR, we will now rewrite it as:
BR′′ If S is in state W(t) and A is an observable on S with eigenvalue ak,
then the probability that S has ak given E(t) is:
p(ak given E(t)) = Tr(W(t)Pak).
Assuming the triggering event E(t) to be the onset of an A-measurement interaction,
we recover the idea, found in classical textbooks [17], that QM probabilities essentially
are conditional upon measurement, and the idea that these probabilities are dispositions,
possessed by S (or the whole of S and the apparatus) at time t, for S possessing ak at some
later time. However, as has been pointed out (at the end of Sec. IV), this later time cannot
be referred to in QM because the theory, as axiomatized here, does not have the formal
resources to refer to two times. (Similarly, again, for QM−.)
So, in the expression ‘ak given E(t)’ the ‘ak’, referring to S and the time at which
eventually it has ak, cannot bear a time-index. We have, thus, consciously violated P2,
but not necessarily P3, since ‘ak given E(t)’ does contain some time reference, after all.
As has been emphasized, however, the discussion at this point takes on an unphysical and
academic character.
Probability expressions of the form ‘p(B given A) = z’ (where z ∈ [0, 1]) have been
thoroughly investigated in the context of QM [18] and three possible analyses have been
found: ‘p(B | A) = z’, ‘A → p(B) = z’, and ‘p(A → B) = z’, where ‘→’ is a conditional
connective awaiting further semantic analysis. It should be added that philosophers and
logicians have mounted substantial evidence that, in general, p(B | A) 6= p(A → B), for
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standard explications of ‘→’ [19]. So, these two forms of explicating ‘p(B given A) = z’ are
indeed logically different and we have (at least) three interpretations for the expression. In
the present context, we have the special condition that ‘B’ in ‘p(B given A) = z’ must not
bear a time-index, i.e. in the relevant BR′′ expression ‘p(ak given E(t)) = z’ ‘ak’ must not
be time-indexed – to escape the contradiction of Sec. III.
We consider the three analyses of ‘p (ak given E(t)) = z’, in turn. It is easy to see that
‘p(ak | E(t)) = z’ is not a live option. The standard (Kolmogorov) definition of conditional
probability is inapplicable, since this would require ‘p(ak ∧ E(t))’ and ‘p(E(t))’ to be
well-defined, which they are not. Defining them appropriately would mean to import them
into QM from elsewhere – something which is clearly inadmissible in a theory dubbed
fundamental and, in addition, breaks the axiomatic closure of the theory. Alternatively,
conditional probabilities can be defined as primitive two-place functions from pairs of events
into the unit interval [20], but the axioms ruling the interpretation of these functions as
probabilities require expressions like ‘p(E(t) | ak)’ to be well-defined. Again, no version of
BR can supply such probabilities and importing them from elsewhere is out of the question.
Consider second ‘E(t) → p(ak) = z’. This variant contracts two problems.
‘z’ is a placeholder for ‘Tr(W(t)Pak)’, in BR
′′. Hence, we have the condi-
tional ‘E(t) → p(ak) = Tr(W(t)Pak)’ containing, as its consequent, an equation
‘p(ak) = Tr(W(t)Pak)’. By assumption, this equation is no longer vague, but defined to
lack a time index on the left and carry one on the right. For a mathematical function
depending on some parameter, this is an inconsistent requirement. Moreover, exporting the
time-reference from the set of events that get assigned probabilities via QM violates our
principle P3.
Consider third p (E(t) → ak) = z. This possibility respects P3. But the unphysical
assumption that its consequent ‘ak’ must not bear a time-index makes it impossible to
distinguish a case where ‘ak’ is true at some unspecified time directly after E(t) from a
case where ‘ak’ is true at a much later time. This allows constructions of obviously false
cases. Suppose that S is a one-particle spin-1
2
system in W(t1) = Pam(t1), where am 6= ak
is another eigenvalue of A. Suppose that E(t1) is the onset of a measurement interaction
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consisting in a series of measurements A – B – A (where [A, B ] 6= 0). Suppose that,
despite the initial state Pam(t1), the second A-measurement yields result ‘ak’. Then
‘E(t1) → ak’ is true and yet p(E(t1) → ak) = Tr Pam(t1)Pak = 0. Of course, we will
understand the physics of the experiment and say that the probability of ‘ak’ being true
directly after E(t) is zero and raises during the course of the whole experiment, but without
a time reference we lack the possibility to distinguish different instances of ‘ak’. The point
is not that we cannot come up with an intelligible distinction of instances of ‘ak’, but rather
that we cannot do so within the present (mutilated) version of QM, where BR is interpreted
as BR′′ and , in turn, is read as delivering expressions of type ‘p(E(t)→ ak) = Tr(W(t)Pak)’.
This argument for a violation of P3 is non-rigorous because it is built on two unproven
meta-assumptions: (i) that the two disambiguations sketched in Sec.II and used at the
beginning of this section are the only possible ones; (ii) that the three proposed analyses
of ‘p(ak given E(t)) = z’ exhaust the possibilities. The argument for QM
− violating P2
is non-rigorous, too, but is based upon a fairly trivial metalinguistic observation about the
axioms: There is a unique time-index in A1–A4.
VI. REVISED AXIOMS FOR QM
As a consequence of the preceding discussion, we cannot express the completeness of
QM by COMP or COMP*. Moreover CPP, our simplest candidate for a precise version
of the projection postulate A5, cannot be used to make it precise. But amendments to
the axioms, guaranteeing harmony with P1-P3, are easily made. A set of axioms for QM
respecting P1–P3 will consist of A1–A2 above plus A3*, A4*, and A5*, specified as follows:
A3* S evolves in time according to W(t) = U(t)W(tP )U(t)
−1 where
U(t) = exp[-iH t], a unitary operator, is a function of time and H is
an operator representing the total energy of S, where tP , some value of,
t is called the preparation time, and W(tP ) the prepared state.
A4* If S is in state W(t) 6= W(tP ) and A is an observable on S, then the
expectation value <A>(t) =
∫
a(t)p(a(t))dω is: <A>(t) = Tr(W(t)A).
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A5* If S has value ak (t1) of A, then t1 = tP and S’s state is the prepared
state Pak(tP ).
Some remarks on these axioms are in order. In A4*, the integral version of the
expectation value serves to clearly specify the meaning of ‘<A> (t)’. It explicates that the
events, the weights of which go into the QM expectation value, are time-indexed events of
type ‘S has ak’. It can indeed be argued (and has been done elsewhere [21]) that requiring
the QM expectations to be expected values, as they are usually defined in statistics, forces
this form for them. A4* now allows deriving a final version of BR, BR*, via the familiar
identification p(ak(t)) = <Pak >(t):
BR* If S is in state W(t) 6= W(tP ) and A is an observable on S with
eigenvalue ak, then the probability that S has ak at t is:
p(ak(t)) = Tr(W(t)Pak).
BR* is BR′, with the restriction that W(tP ) is not an admissible input. More explicitly,
BR* and A5* in conjunction rule that if ‘ak(t1)’ is true then no calculation of a number
p(ak(t1)) is allowed. This is not an implausible restriction. It is reasonable indeed to assume
that the factual observation of an event at a certain time makes it meaningless to calculate
any prediction for that event at that time. Note also that the only axiom making direct
reference to the result of a factual observation, i.e. to a property ascription to S, is A5*. Note
finally the three crucial virtues of this axiom system: (1) It is absolutely explicit concerning
the time parameter; (2) it does not need to use the notion of measurement in any sense;
(3) it allows us consistently to describe measurements as preparations because our findings
upon measurement can be used, via A5*, as an input for A3*.
VII. AN EXPRESSION OF COMPLETENESS
The completeness of QM is embodied in the theorems mentioned above, among others:
the corollary from Gleason’s Theorem and versions of the Kochen-Specker Theorem.
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We have seen that COMP is not an admissible way to express the impossibility results
incorporated in these theorems. Our principle P1 embodies the most reasonable idea that
probability is quantified possibility and P2–P3 represent plausible ways to render precise
the imprecise A1–A5. Given these principles, COMP cannot be an expression of the
impossibilty results, hence of the sense in which QM can be proved to be complete. But
what is an appropriate expression?
To repeat the first observation of this paper: It is impossible to assign pre-existing values
to suitable physical systems beyond the QM allowances, under two plausible constraints.
We will now see that QM, made precise in the sense of A1–A5*, does yield probabilities for
pre-existing values. Hence, it cannot be the idea of assigning pre-existing values as such,
but the one of doing so under conditions (i) and (ii) which we should interpret as disproved
by the completeness theorems. One or both of conditions (i) and (ii) for the assignment of
pre-existing values must be rejected or modified.
It is easy to see that we have produced a general argument for the existence of pre-
existing values. Consider, once more, S being in a state W(t1) 6= Pak(t1) such that p(ak)
gets a value other than 1 or 0, where t1 is the onset time of an A-measurement interaction.
By BR*, ‘p(ak)’ is explicated as ‘p(ak(t1))’, the probability that S has ak at t1, the onset
time. So W(t1), by our new axioms, collects probabilities for values possessed at the time
of measurement onset, t1. This is nothing but the assumption of pre-existing values. The
rationale for BR* can be followed back into our principles. If ‘p(ak)’ does not inherit the
index t1 it cannot bear any time-index, at all – in contradiction with P2 and in obvious
contrast with reasonable requirements for a fundamental probabilistic theory of spacetime
events. If we sacrifice P2 nevertheless and take the remaining option for explicating a
time-reference in ‘p(ak)’, i.e. ‘p(ak given E(t1))’, then no established construal of the
conditional can both be coherent and respect P3. Respecting both P2 and P3, we end with
BR*. Finally, if ‘(ak(t1))’ receives a positive probability, as it does in our case, it must be
logically possible to assume it to be true. This is an instance of P1 and says that it must
be logically possible to assume S having a value ak of A at t1.
As a consequence, it cannot be true that QM is complete in the sense that the QM state
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W(t1) provides all properties S has at t1. Looking only at the axioms (here BR*), W(t1)
does nothing but collect probabilities for S’s values at t1. It is plausible to supplement the
axioms with the rule that predictions with certainty entail value ascriptions (i.e. adopting
the forward direction of EE: If Pak(t1), then ak(t1)), but it is implausible to bar all other
ascriptions. Let A and B be discrete, with values a1, a2,. . ., b1, b2,. . ., and non-degenerate
with [A, B ] 6= 0. Let S be in W(t1) = Pbj(t1). Then, by the rule just adopted, ‘bj(t1)’
is true and exactly one of ‘a1(t1)’, ‘a2(t1)’,. . . is true. Consider now a set of observables
{P}AB, that contains the projectors Pb1, Pb2 ,. . . Pa1 , Pa2,. . . and forms a Kochen-Specker
set (i.e. a set such that a Kochen-Specker contradiction can be derived). What cannot be
true, according to the Kochen-Specker Theorem, is that value assignments to all members
of {P}AB do both of these two: (i) mirror the algebraic relations of the members of {P}AB;
(ii) are non-contextual, i.e. are unique for every member of {P}AB. There are, then,
observables A and B such that all of the above assumptions are true, especially ‘bj(t1)’
is true and exactly one of ‘a1(t1)’, ‘a2(t1)’,. . . is true, and yet it cannot be the case that
of the Pb1, Pb2,. . . exactly one receives value 1, the others 0, and simultaneously, i.e.
noncontextually, one of the Pa1 , Pa2 ,. . . receives value 1, the others 0. In general, we arrive
at the following completeness expression for QM: It is possible to assign pre-existing values
to suitable physical systems beyond the QM allowances, but assignments cannot be such that
values of submaximal (degenerate) observables mirror the algebraic relations among these
observables noncontextually [22, 23].
It is an open question what contextual value assignments would look like. As indicated,
the context-dependence of pre-assigned values must be one of pre-existing values rather than
one depending on measurement influences on S. The prospects for this type of contextuality
(sometimes called ‘ontological contextuality’) have been researched in the past [24, 25], but
without much resonance. The present argument clearly shows that this possibility merits
renewed attention.
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